Ad and tracking blocking extensions are among the most popular browser extensions. These extensions typically rely on filter lists to decide whether a URL is associated with tracking or advertising. Millions of web users rely on these lists to protect their privacy and improve their browsing experience.
Filter lists play a large and growing role in making the web pleasant and useful. Studies have estimated that filter lists save users between 13 and 34% of network data, decreasing the time and resources needed to load websites [12, 35] . Others, such as Merzdovnik et al. [32] and Gervais et al. [13] , have shown that filter lists are important for protecting users' privacy and security online. Users rely on these tools to protect themselves from coin mining attacks, drive-by-downloads [26, 41] and click-jacking attacks, among many others.
Though filter lists are important to the modern web, their construction is largely ad hoc and unstructured. The most popular filter lists-EasyList [6] , EasyPrivacy [8] , and Fanboy's Annoyance List [1] -are maintained by either a small number of privacy activists, or crowd sourced out over a large number of the same. The success of these modules are clear and obvious, as demonstrated by their popularity. Intuitively, more contributors adding more filter rules to these lists provides better coverage to users.
However, the constant growth of filter lists carries a downside as well, the increasing cost of applying larger and larger filter lists to the web. Currently, the size and trajectory of this cost is not studies or generally understood. We find that new rules are added to popular filter lists 1.7 times more often than old rules are removed. This suggests the possibility that lists accumulate "dead" rules over time, either as advertisers adapt to avoid being blocked, or site popularity shifts and new sites come to users' attention. As a result, the cost of enforcing such lists grows over time, while the usefulness of the lists may be constant or negatively trending. Understanding the trajectories of both the costs and benefits of these crowd-sourced lists is therefore important to maintain their usefulness to web privacy, security and efficiency.
This work improves the understanding of the efficiency and trajectory of crowd sourced filter lists through an empirical, longitudinal study. Our methodology allows us to identify which rules are useful, and which are "dead weight" in common browsing scenarios. Using these measurements, we propose a novel method for applying filter list rules which provides nearly identical protections to users, but which performs 62.5% faster than the current, most popular filtering tools.
Research questions. We applied EasyList for two months to 10,000 websites, comprising both the 5K most popular sites on the web, and a sampling of the less-popular tail. We aimed to answer the following research questions:
(1) What is the growth rate of EasyList, measured by the number of rules? (2) What is the change in the number of active rules (and rule applications) in EasyList?
(3) What is the typical lifetime of a new list rule (e.g. is it most popular when its first introduced? What's the die-off rate before each rule becomes stale?) (4) What proportion of rules are useful in common browsing scenarios? (5) Do websites try to stealthily bypass new ad-blocking rules, and if so, how? (6) What is the performance cost of "stale" filer rules to users of popular ad-blocking tools?
Contributions. In answering these questions, we make the following primary contributions:
(1) EasyList over time: we present a 9-year historical analysis of EasyList to understand the lifetime, insertion and deletion patterns of new rules in the list. (2) EasyList applied to the web: we present an analysis of the usefulness of each rule in EasyList by applying EasyList to 10,000 websites every day for over two months. (3) Advertiser reactions: we document how frequently advertisers change URLs to evade EasyList rules in our dataset, and provide a taxonomy of evasion strategies. (4) Faster blocking strategies: we propose changes to the most popular blocking extension, Adblock Plus, that provides over 99% of coverage, but 62.5% faster.
Paper organization. The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Sections 2 and 7 provides a brief background about tracking and ad-blockers as well as a discussion of the related work. Section 3 presents a 9 year analysis of EasyList's evolution. In Section 4 we present how EasyList rules are applied on websites. Section 5 proposes two new blocking strategies to process requests faster. Finally, in section 6 we present the threats to validity, and we conclude the paper in Section 8.
BACKGROUND
Online tracking. Tracking is the act of third parties viewing, or being able to learn about, a users' first-party interactions. Prior work [9, 25, 40] has shown that the number of third-party resources included in typical websites has been increasing for a long time.
Websites include these resources for many reasons, including monetizing their website with advertising scripts, analyzing the behavior of their users using analytics services such as Google analytics or Hotjar, and increasing their audience with social widgets such as the Facebook share button or Twitter retweet button. While third-party resources may benefit the site operator, they often work against the interest of web users. Third-party resources can harm users' online privacy, both incidentally and intentionally. This is particularly true regarding tracking scripts. Advertisers use such tracking tools as part of behavioral advertising strategies to collect as much information as possible about the kinds of pages users visit, user locations, and other highly identifying characteristics. Defenses against tracking. Web users, privacy activists, and researchers have responded to tracking and advertising concerns by developing ad and tracker blocking tools. Most popularly these take the form of browser extensions, such as Ghostery [15] or Privacy badger [11] . These tools share the goal of blocking web resources that are not useful to users, but differ in the type of resources they target. Some block advertising, others block trackers, malware or phishing. These tools are popularity and growing in adoption [31] . A report by Mozilla stated that in September 2018, four out of the 10 most popular browser extensions on Firefox were either adblockers or tracker blockers. Adblock Plus [16] , the most popular of all browser extension, was used by 9% of all Firefox users [10] .
Ad and tracking blockers operate at different parts of the web stack.
• DNS blocking relies on a hosts file containing addresses of domains or sub-domains to block. This approach can block requests with domain or sub-domain granularity, but cannot block specific URLs. Examples of domain-blocking tools include Peter Lowe's list [28] and MVPS hosts [33] . • Privacy proxies protect users by standing between the client and the rest of the internet, and filtering out undesirable content before it reaches the client. Privoxy [34] is a popular example of a intercepting proxy. • Web browsers can attempt to prevent tracking, either through browser extensions or as part of the browser directly. These tools examine network requests and page renderings, and use a variety of strategies to identify unwanted resources. Some tools, such as Privacy Badger [11] use a learning-based approach, while most others use filter lists like EasyList [6] or EasyPrivacy [8] .
EasyList. EasyList, the most popular filter list for blocking advertising, was created in 2005 [6] by Rick Petnel. It has been maintained on Github [7] since November 2009. EasyList is primarily used in ad blocking extensions such as Adblock Plus [16] , uBlock origin [18] and Adblock [2] , and has been integrated into privacy oriented web browsers [21] . Tools also exist to convert EasyList formats understandable to other privacy tools, like Privoxy [3] , EasyList consists of tens-of-thousands of rules describing web resources that should be blocked or hidden during display. The format also includes syntax for describing exceptions to more general rules. EasyList uses a syntax similar to regular expressions, allowing authors to generalize on patterns used in URLs.
EasyList provides two categories of benefit to users. First, Ea-syList describes URLs that should be blocked, or never fetched, in the browser. Blocking resources at the network layer provides both performance benefits (e.g. reduced network and processing costs) and privacy improvements (e.g. reduction in number of parties communicated with or removal of fingerprinting script code).
Second, EasyList describes page elements that should be hidden at rendering time. These rules are useful when blocking at the network layer is not possible. Examples of such cases include:
• Native ads, that are directly integrated in the HTML code of the main page. • Merging ad and tracking resources with other important files required to make the website work. • URL obfuscation techniques, which make it difficult to narrowly identify ad and tracking related resources. Element hiding rules can improve the user experience by hiding unwanted page contents, but cannot provide the performance and privacy improvements that network layer blocking provides. There are three types of rules in EasyList: 
COMPOSITION OF EASYLIST OVER TIME
This section provides a measurement of how EasyList has developed over its 9-year history, through an analysis of project's public commit history [7] . The section proceeds by first detailing our measurement methodology. We find that EasyList has grown to comprise nearly 70,000 rules, and that it is primarily maintained by a very small number of people. The section concludes by showing the most rules stay more than 2.9 years in EasyList before they are removed, suggesting a huge accumulation number of dead rules.
Methodology
EastList is maintained in a public repository on GitHub. We use GitPython [14] , a popular Python library, to measure commit patterns and authors in the EasyList repository over the project's 9 year history. For every commit in the EasyList repository, we record the following:
• The author of the commit.
• The type and number of rules removed from the commit.
We first group commits by day. We then checkout each day's worth of commits, and measure which rules have been added and removed since the previous day. We use this per-day checkout technique to avoid artifacts introduced by diffs, which we found causes over estimations of the number of rules changed between commits. The structure of the repository has changed several times over the project's history. At different times, the list has been maintained in one, or several files, and the repository has at times included other distinct-but-related projects, such as EasyPrivacy. We use the following heuristics to attribute rules in the repository to EasyList. During commits periods when the repository consists of a single file called easylist.txt, we check to see if the file contains references to lists maintained elsewhere, or consists directly of rules. In the former case, we treat EasyList as the union of all rules in all referenced external lists. In the latter case, we treat EasyList the contents of the the easylist.txt file.
When there is no single easylist.txt file, we consider EasyList to be the contents of all the files matching the following regular expression 'easylist_*.txt' and that are located in the main directory or in a directory called easylist.
Results
Rules inserted and removed. Figure 2 presents the change in Ea-syList over time. It shows the cumulative number of rules inserted, removed, and present in the list over time. Rules are added to the list faster than they are removed, causing EasyList to grow larger over time. Over a 9-year period, 121,400 rules were inserted and 50,983 removed, resulting in an increase of 70,417 rules. EasyList's growth is mostly linear. One exception is the sharp change in 2013, when "Fanboy's list", another popular filter list, with merged into EasyList.
Modification frequency. Figure 3 shows a box plot representing the distribution of the time between two commits in EasyList. We see that EasyList is frequently modified, with a median time between commits of 1.12 hours, and a mean time of 4.7 hours. EasyList contributors. Contributors add rules to EasyList in two ways. First, potential contributors propose changes in the EasyList forum 1 . Second, contributors can post issues on the EasyList Github repository.
Thought the EasyList community is in some ways large, we find that only a small number of individuals decide what is added to the project. The five most active contributors are responsible for 70,193 of the 91,547 (76.67%) commits and changes. Figure 4 Lifetime of EasyList rules. Figure 5 presents the distribution of the lifetime of rules in EasyList. The figure considers only rules that were removed during the project's history. Put differently, the figure shows how much time passed between when a rule was added to EasyList, and when it was removed, for the subset of rules that were removed at some point. We observe that 50% of the rules stayed more than 2.9 years (34.4 months) in EasyList before being removed.
APPLYING EASYLIST TO THE WEB
This section presents a measurement of which rules are used when applying EasyList to common browsing patterns. We conducted this measurement by applying EasyList to 10,000 websites everyday for two months, and recording which rules were triggered, and how often. This section proceeds by first presenting the methodology of our longitudinal, online study. We then present the results of this measurement. We find that over 90% of rules in EasyList are never used. We also show that on average, 29.8 rules were added to the list every day, but that these new rules tend to be less used than rules that have been in EasyList for a long time. The section concludes by categorizing and counting the ways advertisers react to new EasyList rules. We detect more than 2,000 situations where URLs are changed to evade rules, and present a taxonomy of observed evasion strategies.
Methodology
Crawl description. To understand the distribution of usefulness of the rules in EasyList, we applied EasyList to 10,000 web sites every day for over two months (74 days). We selected the 10,000 websites based on their popularity. These sites are pulled from two groups:
(1) Popular websites: Websites from the top 5K Alexa, a ranking of sites online by popularity. (2) Unpopular websites: 5,000 websites randomly selected from the Alexa one-million, but not present in the set of popular websites.
We conduct the crawls using an instrumented version of Chromium, which we automated with Selenium. The crawls were launched from AWS Lambda instances located in the us-east-1 region. We provide the code of the Lambda function on Github 2 . For each day of the experiment, we first visit the landing page of each URL in the popular and unpopular sets. We then randomly selecte up to three URLs referenced in anchor tags, pointing to pages on the same domain. We visit those selected, linked to pages, for a maximum of four pages measured, per day, per domain. This resulted in between 10,000 and 40,000 pages being measured every day. Table 1 provides high level statistics of these measurements.
We use the Chrome devtool protocol to record the following information about each network request made during page execution:
• Time of the request • URL of the request • URL of the domain that initiated the request • Type of resource fetched (e.g. image, script, sub-documents)
• Hash of the response • Size of the response Note that we did not block or otherwise modify requests made during this measurement. We further note that these measurements do not consider "element" (i.e. hiding) rules in EasyList.
Then, offline, we use Brave's ad-blocker NodeJS module [20] to apply the the-current version of EasyList to the day's crawl. We determine if each request would have been blocked, excepted, or allowed. A "blocked" request is one that matches a EasyList network rule, indicating that the resource should not be fetched. An "excepted" request is one that matches a blocking rule, but also matches a more specific "excepting", rule indicating that the resource should be fetched anyway. An "allowed" request matches no EasyList rules. Description of the dataset. Our dataset comprises every network request made during our crawl of 10,000 websites, for 74 days between July 24th, 2018 and October 5th, 2018. Among the 10,000 websites crawled daily, 400 (4.00%) never responded during the whole experiment. We attribute this to a mix of websites becoming inactive (common among unpopular websites [36] ) and websites blocking IP addresses belonging to AWS to deter crawlers. We discuss possible limitations to our study more in Section 6.
Results
Proportion of EasyList rules used. We measure the proportion of network and exception rules used during our crawls. We focus on network rules, as opposed to element (hiding) rules because network rules impact performance and privacy. We find that the vast majority of network and exception are never used. We observed only 9.84% (4038) of rules were used even once during our measurements.
An even smaller number of network and exception rules are frequently used, when defined as being used on at least half of days measured. Among popular websites, 5.14% of EasyList network and exception rules were used on half of the measurement days (RQ 4). For unpopular websites, this number drops to 3.47%. We observed that for both popular and unpopular websites, the number of active rules is stable over time (RQ 2). Figure 6 shows the distribution of how often rules were used in the experiment. We see that the distribution is skewed: the majority of rules are either not used (90.16%), or were used between 1 and 100 times (4.45%). Only 3.56% of the rules were used between 100 and 1,000 times, and 1.83% more than 1000 times. Usefulness of EasyList additions. During the experiment, 2, 202 network and exception rules were added to EasyList, an average of 29.8 new rules per day (RQ 1). We call rules added to EasyList during the experiment new rules and rules that were present before the study began old rules.
The vast majority of rules, new and old, were not used during our measurements. Of the 2, 202 rules added during the study period, 208 (9.45%) were used at least once. Those measurements are roughly similar for old rules (9.84%).
However, when considering only rules that were used at least once, we found that new rules were used nearly an order of magnitude less than existing rules. This suggests a declining marginal usefulness for new additions to EasyList, possibly because the most troublesome resources are already blocked. On popular sites, if a new rule was used during the study, it was used an average of 0.7 times per day. Used old rules were applied much more frequently, 4.01 times a day on average. Unpopular websites show a similar gap, with used new rules being applied on average 0.27 times a day, while used old rules being applied on average 2.13 times per day. Lifetime of new rules. We also measured whether new rules become less useful over time. We find that new rules generally decrease in usefulness after two weeks. We present these findings in two ways: graphically and statistically. Figures 7 and 8 show the distribution of how frequently rules are used after being added to EasyList. We observe that median use (green bars) decreases slightly over time for both popular and unpopular sites (RQ 3). The decrease in the usefulness of new rules is more pronounced on unpopular sites. We note the anomaly of increasing median use in the last few measurements. This is caused by outliers among the very small number of new rules that were added at the beginning of our measurement, and remaining in the dataset during the entire measurement period. The popular graph shows a similar, though less pronounced, decreasing-use-over-time trend in the median use (green bar) of new rules. We also conducted two statistical tests to determine whether the usefulness of new rules changes over time:
(1) A t-test to determine if the mean number of uses varies significantly between the first week and after one month, and between the first week and after two months. (2) A Kolmogorov-Smirnov test to compare the distribution of the number of times rules have been used between the first week and after one month, and between the first week and after two months.
To do so, we look at the number of times rules are used in the first week they have been added to EasyList (points 0 to 6 on the x-axis), after one month in EasyList (points 28 to 34 on the x-axis), and after two months in EasyList (points 56 to 62 on the x-axis). Table 2 presents the mean and median uses of new rules during these three periods. The values between parenthesis in the mean and median columns respectively indicate the p-value of t-test and the Kolmogorov-Smirnov between the week associated with the given column and the first week. The mean number of rule uses remains constant over a two-month period for both popular and unpopular sites. Even though there is a decrease after one month, the p-values of the t-test are both > 0.05, which indicates that these differences are not statistically significant. Nevertheless, while the mean number of uses remains stable, that average obscures the effect in the common case. After two months, we observe that the median drops to 0. For both categories of site, the changes in the distribution is significant and is confirmed by the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test with two p-values < 0.05 (0.01 and 0.001).
Thus, we observe a significant shift in the distribution of the number of times new rules are used (RQ 3). The most frequently used rules remain active after two months, but most rules decrease in use significantly.
Advertiser Reactions
EasyList helps users avoid online advertising. Advertisers, and websites that rely on advertising for their income, do not want their content to be blocked and may try to circumvent rules in EasyList. There are several ways an advertiser may do this. One option is try and detect the use of an adblocking tool [22] . Alternatively, the advertiser may manipulate the URLs that serve their content, to prevent matching filter rules. In this section, we measure how often, and in which ways, advertisers responded to EasyList rules. We do not observe a statistically significant reaction by advertisers in general, but note common patterns in avoidance strategies among a subset of advertisers. Advertiser Reactions To New Rules. We first measured whether there is a common reaction to advertisers to being blocked in Ea-syList. We did not find a statistically significant reaction over all. We designed this measure on the following intuition: if a resource changed URL more frequently after being blocked by EasyList then before, it would suggest an advertiser trying to evade EasyList. Similarly, if the number of times a resource was blocked spiked after the EasyList addition, and then reverted to its pre-rule blockrate, that would also suggest advertiser evasion.
We tested this intuition through the following steps. First, we considered only rules that were added during the measurement period, and which remained in EasyList for at least 14 days. Second, we identified resources that were blocked by these new rules, and looked to see if the same resource (as determined by the content's hash), was served by different URLs during the study. Third, we filtered out resources that were less than 50KB, to avoid resources that were trivially identical, like common logos and tracking pixels. Fourth, we measured whether the number of URLs a resource was served from changed significantly before and after being blocked by EasyList. Figures 9 and 10 present the block and allow rates for resources affected by new rules. We did not find any population-wide trends of advertisers modifying URLs to avoid EasyList. As both graphs show, adding a new EasyList rule increased how often affected
Days since a rule has been added to EasyList 
Days since a rule has been added to EasyList resources were blocked (by definition). If advertisers were, in general, successfully evading EasyList, we would observe a decrease in blocking over time. We did not observe such. Blocking levels did not, in general, revert to pre-rule levels over time.
Advertiser Reactions To Old Rules. We also measured whether we could observe advertisers evading existing rules, rules that existing in EasyList before the start of our study. We were able to identify many such evasions, but are unable to measure the significance of such observations, since we lack do not have historical records of block and allow rates for these resources.
We measured advertiser reaction to old EasyList rules by looking for instances of the following pattern:
(1) A resource is referenced by a domain, and that resource is blocked by an EasyList rule. (2) Later, the same resource (determined by the response hash)
is referenced by the same domain, at least two times, and the resource is fetched from a different URL that is not blocked by EasyList.
We observed this pattern 1,411 times on popular sites, where 516 different domains changed the URLs for 751 difference resources to avoid EasyList rules. On unpopular sites, we found the pattern occurring 394 times, with 219 domains modifying the URLs for 177 resources (RQ 5).
Evasion Strategies
In this subsection we present a partial taxonomy of strategies we strategies used by advertisers to avoid EasyList rules.
Changing Domains. Many advertisers changed the domains their resources were served from, either by subtly modifying the domain names, or by completely changing them through domain generation algorithm style techniques. For example, the URL https://c.betrad.com/geo/ba.js?r170201 was blocked by the rule ||betrad.comˆ$third-party. The resource was moved to a new domain, c.evidon.com, to avoid being blocked.
Moving Resources to the First Party. Advertisers avoided Ea-syList rules by moving resources from third-party domains to the first party. For example, we observed the domain etcodes.com including resources from cs02.et-cod.com, which was blocked by the rule ||etcodes.comˆ$third-party. We then observed the same resource being served from etcodes.com directly, which prevented the resource from matching the $third-party modifier in the filter rule.
IMPROVING ADBLOCKING PERFORMANCE
The previous sections demonstrate that most rules in EasyList are not useful in common browsing scenarios. These unused rules not only provide no benefit to users, but they carry a cost. Unused rules degrade the performance of ad-blockers, by increasing the amount of work that must be performed on every network request. The end result is wasted resources and degraded browser performance.
In this section, we build on the findings of the previous sections to present a novel EasyList-based filtering strategy, that provides nearly all of the blocking benefits, but with significantly improved performance. We describe our technique in three steps. First, we describe how current tools use EasyList for blocking (treating Ad-Block Plus, the most popular such tool [10] , as representative of EasyList consuming browser extensions). Second, we present a straw man blocking strategy that only applies frequently used filter rules. Third, we propose a novel hybrid strategy, that achieves nearly the accuracy of existing techniques, with the performance improvements of the straw-man strategy.
The section concludes with an evaluation of the three above strategies on a representative sample of the web. We find that our novel hybrid approach achieves over 99% of the coverage of the current most popular EasyList tool, but performs 62.5% faster. Because of the nature of the optimizations in this hybrid strategy, we expect it could be applied to other EasyList consuming tools to achieve similar performance improvements.
Existing and Proposed Blocking Strategies
This subsection presents three strategies for applying EasyList to the web. The first strategy describes how existing EasyList based filters work. The second strategy only applies the subset of Ea-syList that is likely to be useful to users (as determined by the measurements in Section 4). We include it not a serious suggestion for implementation, but only to highlight the inefficiency of the first strategy. Finally, we describe a new, novel blocking strategy, achieves nearly nearly the full coverage of existing strategy, but with nearly all of the performance improvements of the second. Strategy One: Synchronous Full EasyList. Current EasyList tools decide whether a network request should be allowed by checking the URL of the request (along with some other informaion, such as the type of resource being requested) against every "network" rule in EasyList. More specifically, these tools follow the following steps.
(1) Use hardcoded heuristics, such as not blocking top-level documents or requests coming from non-web protocols. If any of these heuristics match, allow the request. We note two performance impacting aspects of this strategy. First, it performs a large number of unnecessary computation, since every "exception" and "network" rule in EasyList is applied to outgoing request, even though the vast majority (over 90.16%) are very unlikely to be useful (again, based on the measurements described in Section 4). Second, this wasteful computation adds delay to a time-sensitive part of the system. These filter checks are conducted synchronously, blocking all outgoing network requests until all EasyList rules are considered. Strategy Two: Synchronous Reduced List. Next, we describe a straw-man evaluation strategy, that improves performance by only considering the 9.84%of rules expected to be useful. This strategy is otherwise identical to strategy one, and differs only in the number of EasyList rules considered. Instead of applying all of EasyList's 38,710 "network" and "exception" rules, this strategy only evaluates the 4038rules observed during the online measurements discussed in Section 4. The expected trade off here is performance for coverage, since resources that match rarely used filters will be allowed. Strategy Three: Synchronous Reduced List, Asynchronous Complementary List. Finally, we present our proposed blocking strategy, a hybrid strategy that achieves nearly the coverage that full EasyList provides, while achieving the performance improvements of the reduced list. Figure 11 provides a high overview of the hybrid strategy. This strategy uses two steps:
(1) A synchronous, request-time matcher, that operates before each request is issued, but with a reduced version of EasyList. (2) An asynchronous background matcher, that applies the uncommon-tail of EasyList, but only when an request has been allowed by the previous step.
The first step is identical to strategy two. Every outgoing network request is intercepted and blocked until the frequently-used subset of EasyList rules are considered. The step's goal is to minimize how long network requests are blocked, by minimizing the amount of synchronous work. The result is that benign network requests to complete more quickly than in strategy one (e.g. current blocking tools). The second step considers applies the remaining, long-tail of EasyList rules, but at a less performance-sensitive moment. If a network request is allowed by the first step, the request is issued, but the browser continues checking the now-issued URL against the rest of EasyList. This continued checking is done asynchronously, so that it has minimal effect on the load time of the page.
If the asynchronous checker finds any rules that match the URL of the now-issued request, that rule is added to the set of rules applied by the synchronous matcher, so that it will be quickly blocked in the future.
The result of this hybrid strategy is that commonly blocked requests are blocked quicker (because the synchronous blocking step is considering a smaller rule set), benign requests complete faster (again, because of the reduced rule list used in the synchronous blocker), and rare-but-undesirable URLs are adapted to (because the asynchronous matcher moves matching filter rules into the synchronously-applied set).
Evaluation Methodology
In this section we present a methodology for comparing the performance and blocking coverage of different EasyList application strategies. The goal of this methodology is to understand how accuracy and performance trade off against each other, and to empirically compare the above mentioned strategies.
We implemented each of the above strategy in the version Ad-Block Plusfor Chrome available on Github 3 as of 5th July 2018.
In all strategies, we instrumented AdBlock Plusto measure the amount of time needed to evaluate each outgoing network request against EasyList (or the relevant subset of EasyList). For the hybrid approach, we also added timing measurements to the asynchronous step.
We evaluated each of the three blocking strategies against the same selection of popular and unpopular websites discussed in Section 4. As before, these websites are intended to represent both them most common websites users interact with, and the less popular websites in the web's log tail.
We conduct the crawl on an AWS T2 medium instance with 2 virtual CPUs and 4GB of RAM. Since Chromium does not support extensions in headless mode 4 , we use stock Chromium rendered with XVFB, and automated the system with the Puppeteer library 5 . All experiments we conducted with caching disabled.
For each of the three strategies, we visited each of the 10K websites in our sample. We allowed each website five seconds to respond, and then allowed each website to execute for two seconds. The extension measures the time taken by AdBlock Plus(modified or stock) to decide whether to block each network request on each page. Table 3 presents the results of applying the above evaluation methodology against each of the three blocking strategies.
Performance of Blocking Strategies
The first row presents measurements for the stock AdBlock Plusimplementation, which uses a synchronous blocking strategy for all of EasyList. Unsurprisingly, this strategy takes the longest time of the three to determine whether to block a network request, 0.56 ms on average, with a median time of 0.30 ms and a 90th percentile of 0.50 ms. We note that this time is spent blocking each network request, which greatly impacts page load time.
The second row shows the performance of the second strategy; reducing EasyList to its most frequently used rules, and applying that reduced list synchronously. The result of this strategy is faster performance, but with a non-trivial number of false positives and false negatives occurring during blocking. Requests are decided in 0.19 ms on average, with faster median and 90th percentile times. The trade off is that blocking accuracy is reduced. The number of network requests blocked goes up, as a result of some "exception" rules being removed from the EasyList set. Similarly, privacy is reduced, as nearly 18,000 more third-parties are contacted during the evaluation, a result of some "network" rules missing in the reduced EasyList set that would have been useful.
Finally, the third through fifth rows present the evaluation of the hybrid strategy. Rows four and five give measurements of the synchronous and asynchronous modules of the hybrid strategy separately, while row three presents the combined effect. The most significant results for our evaluation are the following:
First, on average, the synchronous module takes 0.21 ms on average to process a request. Thus, perceived blocking time is reduced (compared to stock AdBlock Plus) by 62.5% (RQ 6). Second, the hybrid strategy provides blocking coverage nearly identical to stock AdBlock Plus(> 99%), with only 138 false negatives on 10, 000 websites visited. The 48 "exception" rule errors do not impact the user since both the "exception" rules and the "network" rules being excepted were excluded from the reduced EasyList set. Third, the evaluation shows the adaptive benefit of the hybrid model. The hybrid approach initially applied 3,259 rules synchronously, but after the 10,000 site evaluation, 186 rules from the uncommon asynchronous set were added to the synchronous set.
Finally, we note the surprising finding that the asynchronous portion of the hybrid approach applies its 35K rules faster than the reduced-list synchronous approach, which considers only 3,259 rules. This surprising observation is explained by the synchronous portion of the hybrid approach doing some work (e.g. what kind of resource is being fetched) that can be reused in the asynchronous step.
Overall, we find that the hybrid approach is a successful, performant strategy, especially when compared to current popular blocking tools. By building on the findings discussed in previous sections, the hybrid strategy is able to consider only the subset of EasyList that is likely to be useful in the performance critical path, and can put off evaluating EasyList's to when its less performance impacting. Further, the hybrid approach achieves these performance improvements with a minimal effect on blocking accuracy.
LIMITATIONS
The findings in this study depend on having a sample of the web that generalizes to the types of websites users visit and spend time on. We treat the Alexa 5K, along with a sampling of less popular websites, as representative of typical browsing patterns. While we expect this set to be a good representative of the web as a whole (largely because the highly skewed distribution of website popularity means the most popular sites represent the majority of most user's browsing time), we note it here as a possible limitation.
Similarly, our results may not generalize to localities that are not well represented by the Alexa global rankings. Reproducing our crawl methodology in sites more popular in those regions would be a necessary step to generate locally applicably results.
All of our results were generated from automated crawls, which also may have affected how generalizable our results are. Its possible that different kinds of resources are fetched, and so different parts of EasyList are used, when users interact with websites in particular ways, such as logging in or using web-app like functionality. How generalizable automated crawl results are to the browsing experiences of real users is a frequently acknowledged issue in measurement studies (e.g. [37] ), and one we hope the community can address with future work. Additionally, all crawling done in this work was carried out from well know AWS IP addresses. This means that the results may be affected by the kinds of anti-crawling techniques sometimes deployed against Amazon IP addresses. This in turn could have affected the number and distribution of ads observed during measurement. While this is a common limitation of this kind of web scale measurement, we note it as another limitation of the work.
RELATED WORK
Online tracking. Recent large-scale studies show the growth of third-party tracking on the web [9, 25] . In particular, Yu et al. [40] showed the increase of analytics services (Google analytics) or socials Widgets such as the Twitter retweet button or Facebook's share button that are used for tracking. Englehardt et al [9] showed companies such as Google, Facebook, Twitter, Amazon, AddNexus, and Oracle on more than 10% of the websites of the top Alexa 1M. Libert et al [27] showed that 180k pages of the top 1M Alexa websites had cookies spawned by the DoubleClick domain, a company owned by Google that provides behavioral advertising services. Defenses against tracking. A lot of effort has been put into blocking trackers and advertising. The NoScript extension [30] enables to prevent JavaScript execution. While this approach blocks trackers, it also greatly impacts the user experience as the majority of modern websites use JavaScript for legitimate purposes. This trade-off between privacy and usability is important. Yu et al. [40] explain that besides simply improving user satisfaction when sites are broken because of privacy countermeasures, the user may deactivate it, which may lead to privacy leaks. The most popular kind of tracking protection is browser extensions such as Ghostery [15] , Disconnect [5] or uBlock origin [18] , as well as browsers such as Brave [21] or Safari [19] that enable to block third-party requests.
Besides blocking trackers, other tools are also targeting advertising. Even though ad-blockers enhance privacy, Mathur et al [31] showed that most of the people use them mainly not to be disturbed by advertising. Different strategies have been proposed to decide whether or not a request should be blocked. Privacy Badger [11] uses a learning-based approach. Iqbal et al. [23] also proposed a machine learning approach that leverages features extracted from HTML elements, HTTP requests, and JavaScript to predict if a request should be blocked. Storey et al. [38] propose a visual recognition approach based on the hypothesis that according to the law, ads must be recognized by humans. Yu et al [40] proposed a crowdsourced approach where users collectively identify data elements that could be used to uniquely identify users. Nevertheless, the majority of anti-tracking and ad-blocking tools such as Adblock Plus [16] , uBlock Origin [18] and Adblock [2] , which are among the 10 most popular browser extensions on Firefox [10] all rely on filter lists.
Different studies [10, 35] show that tracker blockers and adblockers are popular among the general population. Malloy et al [29] showed that depending on the country, between 16% and 37% of the Internet users had an ad-blocker installed.
Effectiveness of anti-tracking tools. Gervais et al. [13] quantified the privacy provided by the main ad-blockers. They show that on average, using an ad-blocker with the default configuration reduce the number of third parties loaded by 40%. Merzdovnik et al. [32] showed that rule-based approaches outperform the learningbased approach used by Privacy Badger. They also show that extensions that rely on community-based lists (Adblock Plus, uBlock Origin) are less effective than extensions based on proprietary lists such as Disconnect or Ghostery when used with the correct settings. Their study demonstrates that besides blocking trackers, most of these extensions have a negligible CPU overhead. In some cases, it even leads to a decrease of the overall CPU usage of the browser.
Maintaining filter lists. In order to keep up with new domains creating and domains changing their behavior, it is crucial to maintain filter lists. Because it is a cumbersome task and it needs to be done carefully not to break websites, Gugelmann et al. [17] proposed an automated approach that relies on a set of web traffic features to identify privacy invasive services and thus help developers maintaining filter lists.
Since tracking and advertising are used by websites to monetize their content, it is critical for them to escape ad-blockers. Thus, different approaches such as randomizing the identifier or the HTML elements have been proposed [39] . Recently, Facebook has been applying this technique to show advertising to users with ad blockers [4] . This adversity has also been discussed by recent studies on anti-ad-blockers [22, 42] , i.e. scripts whose purpose is to detect and block ad-blockers to deliver advertising to more users. Iqbal et al. [22] conducted a retrospective measurement study of anti ad-block filter lists using the Wayback machine. They applied the Anti-Adblock Killer List, the most active anti ad-blocker list, on historical snapshots of Alexa top-5K, and measured that the list triggers only on 8.7% of the websites. They also show that similarly to EasyList, these anti ad-block lists keep growing over time, with more rules inserted than removed. While their approach enables to detect advertisers that actively asks users to deactivate their adblockers to show them ads, the approach we propose in Section 4.3 focuses on advertisers that bypass filter rules stealthily, i.e. without interacting with the users.
CONCLUSION
In this paper, we study EasyList, the most popular filter list used for blocking advertising related content on the web. We find that the vast majority of EasyList consists of rules that are rarely, if ever, used in common browsing scenarios. We attempt to measure the number of these "dead weight" rules, and measure their negative effect on browser performance, through comparison with alternative, data-driven EasyList application strategies. We find that by separating the wheat from the chaff, and identifying the small subset of EasyList filter rules that provide common benefit for users, we can capture over > 99% of the benefit of EasyList, with a 62.5% performance improvement.
More broadly, we hope this work will inform how similar crowd sourced security and privacy tools are developed and maintained. As previous work [24] has identified, such lists tend to accumulate cruft as they accumulate new rules. Over time, the benefit of such tools risks being outweighed by the amount of dead weight pulled with them. We hope the findings in this work highlight the need for regular pruning of these lists, to keep them lean and as helpful to users as possible.
